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EXTERNALITIES, INCENTIVES, AND ECONOMIC REFORMS
ABSTRACT
The paper emphaairea rhe role of institurions and inrentivea in rhe
presence of exrernalitiea. An economy dith multiple public decision makers
is likely to experience 'overspending," "undertaxing," "overborrowing," and
"overinflation" unless effective inaciturions exiat for overcoming
coordination failure. ixternal financing may weaken incentives for
adjustment over the longer run unless assistance is made conditional on
fundamental institutional reforms. The paper alan analyses reforma that
strengthen to provide effort. Uncertainty regarding future taxea
seduces presenteffort and the responsiveness of output to market signals.
In addition, the paper addresses the adverse effects of bank insurance and
soft budget constraints,
Joshua Aizec,man Peter Isard
Economics Department Research Department
Dartmouth College International Monetary Fund
hanover, NM 03755 Washington, DC 20431I. Introduction
Much attention Is currently being focused on marker-oriented reform
crograms for plsnned economies. In msny respects, the msin issues sre
ai,silor to those tbsc srise in designing adjustment progrsms fur economies
rbsr are market oriented to begin with. Although the difficulties that
programs must be designed to address vary considerably among countries and
change ever time, the successes and shortcomings of programs that have
already been implemented provide many general lessons. 1/
lhrspaper attempts to reinforce and provide deeper insights into
eeverul uf toe mesc important lessens. The essential purpose of economic
rfecr pregreas, by definition, is to establish institutions and implement
policiesthur provide incentives for individual decision makers to behave
in ways rhu r are rullectiveiy desirable. Accordingly, the uualyais
focuses sredoainanriy en externalities and incentive structures,
emrbesicrng thar maereecenemlc performance--and the ability to implement
effective macrcecenemic peliclea--depends fundamentally on the monetary,
fiscal,and legal institutions that motivate and constrain individual
decision makers.
The main body of the paper is divided into four sections,
Section' II addresses negative externalities associated with multiple
public decision makers (e.g., different ministries or regional
eurhuriries), It is shovn that, in the absence of effective institutional
arrangeaanrsfor uvercr.'ring "coordination failure, "rheseexternalities
reuse a bias to "overspend," "underrax," "overborrov, "and"overinflare"
1/See, for example, Kernel (1986).relative to the 000petetive equilibrium, The presence of such
externaiitiee euggeete thet mecroeconoaic control will he difficult
withoute strong central benk end a reliable mechaniem for controlling the
public budget.
Section III tutne to the ieeue of how the aveilebility of external
reeoutces ie likely to effect e country's incenrivee to retry thtough its
adjustment and reform effotte. The analysis euggeete thet en iofueion of
extetnal resources increases the ehott- tun geine ftom ovetcoming
coordinetion failute but mey weeken incentivee fot adjustment and tefotm
over the longet run. Making external financing conditional on fundamental
institutional reforms thus incteesee the likelihood of overcoming
cootdinstion feilute on e lasting basis.
tection IV eddteeees the x-efficienoy production geine that can be
echieved by changing the incentives faced by enterprise manageta while
slso ensuring a given volume of public tax tevenue (and presetviog the
real inccme of nonmanagerial labor) .inaddition to focusing on the
compatarive static gains from tax system reforms, we address the adverse
effects of tax uncertainty. It is shown that uncettainty regatding
futute taxes will reduce present affott, and will also teduce the
responsiveness of output to ptoduotivity changes and othet market signals.
This suggests that systems that tax anterptises and other eoonomic agents
on a uniform basis will tend to genetete more effort and output than
systems in which tax rates are subject to agent-specific uncertainty. It
also suggests that effort and output are enhanced by credible fiscal
leadership that reduces the general level of uncertainty regarding future
taxes.-3-
Section '7 analyzes the implicationa of aocial "insurance (in
whatever iotm, explicit or implicit) for the behavior of banks and other
firma. The analyaia of banks illustrates that insurance can have adverse
implicationa both for the quality of the investment projecta that banks
finance and for inflation. The analysis of atate-inaured firma
illustrates that soft budget constraints can have adverse implications for
the efficient uae of reaourcea and fom the wage-price apical. These
perepectivea provide an argument for allowing banks and other firma to
foil, end for promoting a competitive environment in which the aize and
political influence of individual enterprises does not pmeclude the
poaaibility of allowing them to fail. This does not deny argumenta for
providing an adequate social safety net, but it does auggeat that aocial
aafety nets can provide counterproductive incentivea if they ace not
designedcarefully.
Section VI provides concluding remarks.
II.Sxtecnalities Associated with Multiple
Public Decision Makers
One of the moat formidable tasks in designing a reform program, in
many cases, is the challenge of changing the behavior of the public
aector. The challenge can be particularly difficult when control over
public apending, or over money and credit expansion, is aptead among
nuxoeroua decision makers representing different regions of the country or
different miniatciea of the central government. It is widely acknowledged
that lack of centralized control over public deficits -and money and credit
expansion can undermine an adjustment program, but it mutt also be
acknowledged that political realities generally limit the scope fordiluting the powers of eetablished ministries and regional authorities.
In this oontext, itisessential to teoognite that the rase for puhlio
seotor rafora is basad on negative externalitiee transmitted through rhe
inflation prooess, and that suoh externalities hold out the prospaot of
actdaspread benefits froa suooessful reforms. The undetlying problem ia
irherantlu a amtter of "ooordination failure." j/
1.Agjpleexae
The following example illustrates the nature of the negative
inflation externalities and potnts to diffetent apptoaohes for addressing
the toordination failnre thtough resttuotuting institutions and aodifying
inoentives. tonsider an eoonoay in whioh aggtegate reel fisoal spending




Assumethat part of government spending is finanoed by money oreation.
More spetifitally, suppose that the expansion of reel money bmlsnoes (M/P)
depends positively on reel fisoel spending, end thmt the rate of inflation
(a)is an inoteesing funotion of the ohange in the money supply:
(2) —=g(0); ->O
1/ On oootdinmtion ptobleas in the oontext of fisoal polities, see
Alesina end Tebellini (1987). On ttordinmtion end seignotage, see
Aizenman (118Pm). On the role tfthepolitital eoonomy in stabilization
end inflation, see Alesine and Orazen (1919), Oukietman, Edwetds, end
Tabellini (1989) and Brunt (1989).-5-
GM, Es
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Inaddition, assume that the welfare achieved by the th minister is
summarized by a utility index (Ui) that depends pcsitively cn his own
spending level and negatively cn the rate cf inflation: /
EU. EU.
(4)U. =U.(C,s); >C;o— <C
i1 1 34. air 1
Accordingly,by combining conditions (l)-(4), each minister's utility
level can be re-expressed as a function of both his own spending level and
the spending levels of all other ministers:
(5) U.U.(41,C2 ,,n' < Cforij.
Thioia a classic case of a negative competitive externality. /If
each minister acts independently, taking the choices of other ministers as
N




],./Thenegative marginal utility of inflation may reflect either the
decisionmaker's sensitivity to the attitudes of hisconstituents or an
environment(see Aizenman (lESEa)) in which real spending levels are
eroded by inflation.
2/For purposes of highlighting a particular source of negative
externalitiesthat has received considerable emphasis by economists
involved in the practice of program design, we ignore the positive
externalities that government spending may provide.could be undermined by incentives to cheer. Other epprcachee tc demling
with the cccrdinericn failure involve legal frameworks and penalty
mechaniama for constraining the amount of spending that miniatera can
finance. For example, the apending limira of cabinet ministers might be
apecified through a centralized appropriations proceas, while apending by
regional governmenta might be restricted (relative to tax revenues) by
constitutional law. To the extent that legal frameworka often develop
loopholes, moreover, a strong central bank can play an important role by
refusing to monetize fiscal deficits,
2.oreenerslframework
The previous example, of course, is draatically oversimplified in
many respects. The inflationary impact of government spending generally
stems primarily from spending in excess of tax revenues; government
deficits era often financed on credit rather than through direct money
creation; and the links between fiscal deficita and inflation may be quite
complex.
Accordingly, it is worth noting that the same basic framework applies
to cases in which the coordination fsilute involves inadequate collection
of tax revenues (Ti) by different regional authorities tether than
excessive spending levels (Of) .1/Moreover, the framework extends to
any macroeconomic model that generstes a positive reduced form
1/ Friot to the reforms undertaken since a new Oovetnment took office
in Match 1939, macroeconomic management in Yugoslavia was undermined by,
among othet things, lack of federal authority in setting tax rates, which
varied substantially ectoss end within republics.-8-
relationship between inflation and the son of the regional budget deficits
(°) In the note general case, the inflation process would reduce to the
-mpie iotm
(i)71act):> 0
whereD is the aggregate deficit
0 1 0.
1 11
Thepreferencela tructIre would be characterized as:
(OH Ji—Ui(0i,T,a) =iJ[0,T,ir(I(C.-T.fl];
<0; < Q
Accordingly,the optimizing noncooperative choices of tax levels (T)
will satisfy
Oh.Oil.
1 1 dir (6'
whilothe cooperative outcomes (T)--for the symmetric case in which all





Thesetwo outcomes are contrasted in Figure 2 for the "normal case" in
shich higher taxes provide positive and increasing partial motgtnal
disutility and contribute to reducing inflation, while lower inflation
provides higher marginal utility, Without cooperation- -or in the absence
of institutional mechanisns that lead the authorities of indivtdual






authoritiessill set taxes below the collectivelyoptimallevel,regional
budgets will be excessively in deficit, and the national inflation rate
sill exceed the optimal leel. j/ It ia noteworthy that enriching the
model will broaden the distortive effect of coordination failure For
example, if the economy has access to the international credit market, it
will ovetborrow, /7 1/
3. Incentives to overcome coordination failure
Ihe existence of negative externalities implies that the various
political constituencies in any coontry (whether defined by region,
ministry, or otherwise) can be made better off, in principle, if a
politically acceptable mechanism can be found for ovetcomiug coordination
failure--i.e., if institutions and incentives can be established that
wLllmove the iudiv'ldual decision makers collectively away from the
//Notethat in Figure 2, the MG aurve corresponds to the marginal cost
ofhigher taxes (Ti) ,MBhis the marginal benefit as perceived by the
decision maker in the noncooperative regime, and MB° is the marginal
benefit in the cooperative regime.
2/ gee Airenman (1989b).
1/ The prospect of "undertaxation" and "overbotrowing" has raised
concern in the context of the movement toward greater monetary and
ocunomic integration in gurope. Indeed, the Reuurt of the Debra
Committee (19d9) has suggested that "binding rules are requited . .. (tol
impose effective upper limits on budget deficits of individual member
countries of the Community (p. 17). See also Casella and
Feinstein (19Sf).- 10-
noncooperativeequilibrium to the collectively optimal outcome. The
challenge in practice, of course, is to find a politically acceptable
mechanism. There is a large body of collected wisdom on thestrengths end
weaknesses of different types of institutionalarrangements, and on
certain issues- -such as the importance of imposing hard budgetconstraints
on fiscal authorities and establishing strong central control overmoney
and credit expansion--there is a strong consensus of opinion. Ingeneral,
however, we view the challenge of establishing institutional
errangements
to overcome coordination failure as a challenge to which different
countries are likely to find different solutions, given the different
institutional arrangements end political considerations from whichthey
start. Accordingly, the formulation of mechanisms for overcoming
coordination failure is largely e country-specific task end is beyond the
scope of this paper.
A positive general theory of the requirements for overcoming
coordination failure is also beyond the scope of this paper. The
eppecling approach to developing such e theory is to focus on the
strategies that individual decision makers can employ in maneuvering for
larger oheres of the aggregate gain. The role of delay tactics hms been
emphesiced in this context, 1/
An appealing hypothesis, however--even in the absence of e positive
theory--is that the incentive to overcome coordination failure is
positively related to the aggregate gain that con be echieved. An
increase in the aggregate benefits foregone (or coors incurred) by not
1/ Alesina end Draren (lPgg).- ii-
overcomingcoordination failure is likely to limit the extent to which
individualdecision makers maneuver fot s rote favorable distribution of
the benefits (or costs)This hypothesis is consistent with the view that
it often takes a crisis to catalyze fundamental institutional reforms,
III. External Resources and Incentives to Reform
The previous discussion and analytic framework leads naturally to the
issue of how the availability of external resources affects the strength
ci a counttys incentives to undertake reforms.
The impetus for a reform program or a growth-oriented adjustment
urogtam typically aaetqea from a state of general economic turmoil,
Oounttiea In need of effective progrmmm are often saddled with heuvy
extetnal d0b tbutdensand, in any case are typically in need uf external
resoutce a for balance of payments financing. In the context of the
evolving debt strategy, there is a broad consensus that effective
adjustment requires both strong domestic policies and external resources--
as essential complereents- -along with an external environment that suppotte
the efforte of the adjusting country to strengthen its export revenues. 1/
A view ham also emerged that problem countries are trapped in a "bad
equilibrium," and that a successful transition to a "good equilibrium"
with attractive prospects for growth requires an adjustment effort- -in
terms, implicitly, of both policy actions and external resources--that Is
sufficient in scale to preclude confidence failures ./orcredibility
crises. 1/
1/ Cemdeaaus (1988).
2/ Blejer and Ire (1989).
j/Calve(1190).- 12-
Theseviews are virtually indisputable, but there is an important
caveat: namely, that the prevision of externel resources can conceivably
reduce the pressures for a counrry to underreke strong policy acrions,
thereby putting at risk both the prospects for growth end the country's
ability to eventually repay its creditors. This caveat has been the basis
for the evolving practice of "conditionality," whereby the manner it which
external resources are provided over time is linked to the credibility of
polity intentions and the achievement of agreed performance criteria. 1/
Acentral question in the theory of conditionality is the extent to which
performance criteria ought to be specified in terms of the implementation
of fundamental institutional reforms, rather than simply in terms of
traditional quantitative performance indicators. /
1/The "theory and practice of conditionality" will undoubtedly be
affected in the period ahead by the success of the reform program
launched in Poland at the beginning of the year.In particular, the
experience in Poland is likely to provide important perspectives on the
wisdom of a "trash program" in which reforms are introduced fairly
rapidly, rather than phased in gradually over time.
2/ See Cuitidn (1981) for a discussion of the principles and practices
of International Monetary Fund conditionality as of the early lSPOa. In
recant years, there has been a growing awareness within the Fund that
"structural weaknesses" impede the effectiveness of macroeconomic
policies, and that in many cases, successful adjustment requires that
"structural measures" be implemented at an early stage of the adjustment
program.- 13-
Inthis section, we extend the framework from Section II to analyze
how the availability of external resourcea affects incentives to
undertake fundamental reforms. We thus continue to focus on the negative
inflation externalities associated with multiple public decision makers
(e.g. ,theauthorities of different regions of the country) and the
potential gains from institutional reforms to deal effectively with a
situation of "coordination failure."
The first step is to characterize the relationship between the rate
of inflation and the level of external resources (F). We view F as the
net transfer of external resources to the government, such that the fiscal




Itis convenient to focus simply on the spending side of the coordination
problem; accordingly, we assume that tax revenues (I) are collected at the
nationallevel, and for the symmetric case in which the n regional
spending authorities are all alike, we represent the inflation process as.
itm(n01-T-F)
As before, the utility index for the authorities of region i is written as
—Ui(Ci,)
The noncooperativeoutcome (0) satisfies
dO'. SOT. 30.
t tt (6j— —-r — it= 0
do. so. sit
and yields the utility level
=U(O,m(n0-T-F))- 14-
The-cooperative outcome (O-) satisfies
dU. au. a-u.
(7") n it'0
and yields the utility level
v0(T+F) Ui(0P,m(n0.-T.F))
The difference between v0 and pN provides a measure of the gain from
adapting institutional reforms that successfully address the coordination
iailure and induce the individual authorities to lower their spending
levels from 0 to oHAlternatively,v0 - measuresthe cost of
coordination failure. As in the analysis of the stability of a cartel, we
presume that higher coordination failure costs will enhance the prospects
of imposing the discipline needed to reach the cooperative equilibrium.
Similarly, if the cooperative equilibrium has already been reached, a
hegher cost of coordination failure will reduce the temptation to behave
noncooperatively.
Another useful measure of the stability of the cooperative
equilibrium is the amount that an individual decision maker would gain if
he were the only one to move away from the equilibriuss. This measure of
the marp.inal temptation to deviate from the cooperative equilibrium is the
difference between the marginal benefit and the perceived marginal cost of
higher fiscal expenditure G evaluated at the cooperative equilibrium. As
represented on Figure 1, this is rhe vertical difference between a and b0.
We investigate the dependency of each of these two measures on the
volume of external resources. A key result developed in the Appendix is
that a larger volume of external resources will increase the gain from- 15-
overcomingcoordination failure and reduce the temptation to deviate from
thecooperative equilibrium. This reault has eeveral important
implications. First, it emphasizes that the provision of external
resouroes oan have two effects; in addition to allowing a oountmy to
increase its absorption in the absence of coordination, extetnal
resources can play a catalytic role in overcoming coordination failure.
Second, by also emphasizing that the temptation to deviate from the
cooperative equilibrium may strengthen after the transfer of external
teanurces has taken place end debt-servicing obligations come due, it
auggests that the full benefits of external resources are unlikely to be
.achieved unless the provision of external resources is made conditional on
adjustment measures and/or institutional reforms that ate capable of
cvecccming cootbination feilute on a lasting baaia.
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Startingin the noncooperative equilibrium, an increase in extetnal
tescutcea will have mixed effects on incentives to cooperate. On Impact,
1/ Pa use and [Z}, respectively, to denote the values of Z in
the conpetative end noncooperative equilibriums.- ii-
itwill increase fiscal income (Tag), thereby raising the cost of
coordination failure and improving the prospects of aoving to the
cooperative outcome. In the future, however, this effect may be mote than
tavarsad if the inflow of external resources ends and an outward net
resource transfer is required to servics rho- -2xrarnal debt
In considering the possible implications for the future, however, it
is essential to recognize that new external resources providedtoday not
only have affects on future debr-sarvicing requirements but also hava
affects on future output, tax revenues, and dabr-servicing capacity. More
formally, suppose chat tax revenue (T) aquals rY, where r is theaverage
tax rare and Y is output. The implications of currant external resources
for future fiscal income is than 1/
8(T1+g1)a(rY)1BF,1 =
Thafirst term on the right-hand side measures the effect on future tax
revenue while the second term measures the negative effect on the future
transfer of extarnal resources due to increased external debt. An
important role of conditionality is to ensure that the bulk of foreign
resources are used to finance investment instead of fiscal consumption.
This will increase future tax revenue and, if the investment is productive
enough, the first term will dominate the second. In this case, the
provision of foreign resources today will raise the cost of coordination
/Thesubscript +1 denotes the future valua of the variable to which
it is attached,- 17-
failureboth today and in the future. In the absence of sufficiently
attong conditionality, however, the external resourcea aay be used
primarily to financa consumption rather than investment and output growth
If this leeds to a net drop in future fiscal income, the favorable effects
of external resources on incentives to overcome coordinatIon failure will
only be cemporsry.
IV. K-Efficiency end Approaches to Raising Public Revenues
Theprevious sections of the paper have iccused on the improvements
in economic conditions that can be achieved by overcoming coordination
failure in the presence of negative inflation excernslities. Another
major suurce of improvemenr in economic conditions is the potential for
raising producrive efficiency.
gnllnwingLeibensrein (l9gG) ,mnimportant disrinctinn has been drawn
betweeneilocsrive efficiency end "x-efficiency," where x-efficiency is
relsted to motivation, incentives, and other nunsllocative considerations.
Themovement to e market-based price system can provide important gains in
rerrsof allocstive efficiency, while the movement to s system in which
managers and nonmanageriel workers hmve strong economic incenrives to
increase productivity can achieve substantial gains in terms of
x-sfficiency.
1.A simple exampig
Thefollowing model illustrates the nature of the x-efficiency gains
that csn be schieved by moving sway from a system in which the governirent
claims rho entire surplus of enterprise revenues over costs to a system
in which enterprise managers (or nonmsnagerisl workers) ore ullnwed toif -
keeçpart of any additional surplus they produoa. To abstraot from iasuas
of siloosoive affioianoy, assmse a ona-good aodal in whiob output (Y) ia
pooduoad with nonisanagarial labor and aanagarial affort or affioianoy
(5). In tha traditional seotor, aaoh unit of labor produoaa ona unit of
output. In tha antrepoaneurial aeoror, the labor requioaaanr par unit of
output is 1-f(s). Thus, if the aggragata supply of labor and ohs number
of entrepreneurs are denoted as b sod N, respeotively. and if eaoh
entrepreneur produoes Qunitsof output, employment in the entrepreneurial
seotor (L5) oan be written as
525 (2)P5NQ(l-f(Efl; >
The aggregate output of the eoonomy is
(lOs) Y =NQ+(P-b5)=P+NQf(E)
bebor Er paid a real wags equal to its marginal produot in the traditional
s000or, whiob is one unit of output. The amount of output that is not
distributed to labor (y) represents the sum of the output distributed to
managers (5) and the net revenue oolleoted by the national authorities
(A):
(lOb) y Y -PNQf(E) =S+A
Entrepreneurs are homogeneous with identiosi utility funotions that depend




As the initial state of the eoonomy, ooosider the osse in whiob the
050sger is paid a fixed salary and supplies e level of effort just- 19-
sufficientto generate a target net surplus R0. Hence, if a' snd
denote the initial levels of salary and effort, the initial state is
charactericad by:
(13) Ha' e=HQf(E')
'Ac think of E' as the ainiaal level of effort consistent with each
entrepreneur aeeting a target of Ro/N. j/ The manager has no incentive to
increase effort beyond the minimum when all additional output would simply
be claimed by the national authorities.
Experience baa demonstrated that dramatic increases in outpnr con be
achieved by reformLng the effective tax ayatem to provide significant
incentives to increase effort. 2/ To illustrate, suppose the national
2/ E' would er.erge, for example, if the manager's contract paid no
salary in the absence of meeting Ro/N, and if U(E' ,a')>U(U,O).
2/ The introduction of incentives for entrepreneurial effort has lad to
a profound trnnaformation of the Chinese economy, with real CHP growth
averaging close to 10 percent per year over the 1978-88 period. These
incentives were not introduced through the tax system per ad, but rather
through a series of reforms in rural areas beginning in rhe late 1970a
(including incentives introduced through the household responatbiiiry
system) and in urban areas beginning in 1984 (including managerial
incentivesintroduced through the contract responsibility ayoraa) see
Blajer and Saapary (1989). Unfortunately, in the lace i98Ua, China
experienced a deteriorating fiscal poaition and rapid inflation in the
context of a relatively low-income elasticity of tax revenues and
insufficiently a::rong central control over money and credit- 20-
authoritiesintroduce a system in which public cswsnuss ars collected by
taxing the axcass of output cvsr the wags bill at a proportional rats (t),
and in which cbs manager keeps the residual. From conditions (lob) and
(12), cbs after-rax income of cbs individual manager is:
(14)a =(l-t)Qf(E)
Assuming char cbs marginal tax rare is less than 100 percent (is. r<l)
this sysrsmic raform provides an incentive for the managar to increase
effort cc the iaval that msximizss U(E,s) subject cc (14). The optimizing
manager will thus choose the level cf 5 that satisfies





In Figure 3, the upward sloping curve in the top panel rsflscrs the
prcducr of the two tsrms on the left hand side of (15): cbs aansgsr's
marginal rats of substitution in consumption between income and sffort
(i.e., cbs ratio of cbs marginal disutility of effort to the marginal
utility of income) ; and rhe reciprocal of the marginal (pre-cax) rscurn to
affort, Each of these terms will normally ha an increasing funcrion of
afforr, which implies that cbs upward sloping curvs is normally upwardly
concaws. The horizontal lines in the figure rsflscc diffsrsnc lsvsls of
rhs tax rats. The intsrssccions of cbs upward sloping curve with cbs
family of horizontal linsa define the combinations of t and E char satisfy
condition (15). These combinations, as shown in cbs lowsr panal, dsacribs
cbs manager's optimal supply of affort as a funcricn of the aftar-cax rats
















successivelydiminishing responses to increases in ths after-tax ree. As
drawn, the figure mist reflects an assumption that below sore minimal
positive level of the after-tax tate, the meneget will not exert any
effort
Figure 4 Arscribes the level and distribution of output ma functions
of th e°ffer-°mx rete. Foot or°itions (lOs) and (lOb) sub °o1wet
panel of Figuoo 3, both Y and y wil] normally he upwardly c-i-vex funotions
of the after-rex rate.
The upwardly concave curve in l.e to panel of Figure 4 (curve 2)
represents the after-tax income of oeue4-c' .Managerialin- -c ranges
from 0, at after-tax rates that are insufficient to induce a :v effort, to
the entire excess of output over the wege bill so an after-tax rate of
unity. 1/ The gap between y and S corresponds to the Ocx revenue of the
nuoicnel authorities, as plotted in the lower panel. The tax revenue
iuurt, has e well-known feature: revenue rises ss the tax ret is
inisially increased from zero, but beyond some critical lvol any
sddioionel increase in the tax rate will reduce tax revenue.
Figure 4 illustrates the x-efficiency gems that csn be s-hieved
through chenges in the Osx system. Recall that, in the initial state of
the economy, menegeos were paid a flat salary s' at which they were
induced- -perheps through the threat of losing their jobs end selsry- -to
suoply the minimel level of effort E' consisrcno uith generating a target
surplus R0 for the national authorities. As Figure 4 is drwn. under s
tax sysrem in which the mensger' 5 income does not include e fixed selsoy


















but.is an increasing funcrion of rhe effort ho supplies, rhe rex rare r0
would replicaro rho initial ouroome for rho rex revenue of rho national
aurhoriries.Under rho same proportional tax system, however, areduction
inthe tax rare could induce a higher level of effort, which nor only
would raise the after-tax incomes of managers, but also couldgenerate
higher tax revenue, As the figure is drawn (holding the wage bill fixed),
any tax rots in the range between to and t1 would provide at least g,,, in
tax revenue while allowing managers to enjoy incomes higher than at to.
The difference hotween Psg and Us' measures the x-effioienoy gain
thor ran be achieved hy shifting from a system that offers no osward for
msnsgsrioleffort (beyond some minimal level) to s proportional tax
system that generates the same revenue for the national outhorities, The
x-efficiencygain results from the incentives provided by raising the
manager's after-tax rate to l-t1. /
Anadditional x-efficienoy gain can be achieved by raising rho
manager's marginal after-tax rate to the upper limit of 1.In particular,
under a system in which each manager was assessed a lump sum tax of g07y
and allowed to keep 100 percent of his marginal output, the level of
output (net of the wage bill) would rise to ymsx' The shift from rho
/ The fact that x-officioncy results only from greater effort on rho
part of management is obviously an implication of our specific over-
simplified example. In reality, important x-efficienoy gains can also be
achieved by providing stronger incentives to non.mansgerial labor.- 23-
proportionaltax t1 to a revenue-preserving lump sum tax would achieve an
x-effioiencygain of Ymax -Yl/
2. Intertemporal considerations and uncertainty
Although lump sum taxation aay appear to be an optimal system based
on the previous example, the experience of setting enterprise-speciiic tax
rates or "effective tax" tacea has led, in some countries, to petverae
incentives over time. L'Suchperversity can arise ii enterprises come to
believe that their lump sum tax asseasmenta in iatura periods will reflect
their profitability in the currant period. Moreover, uncertainty about
future tax rates can have a depressing effect on the level of effort
expended by enttepraneuts. While the influence of pulity uncertainty on
1/Itmay also be inteteating to consider a proportional tax on the
incomes of both managers and labor, which is equivalent to a value-added
tax. Siven a target for total tax revenue (R0), the shift to a value-
added tax from a proportional tax on managerial income alone would involve
a reduction in the tax rota on managerial income, thereby inducing a
higherlevel of aggregate output in our example. The output gain would be
achieved, however, through a radio tribution of income away from non-
managerial labor, which might make it unreasonable to treat the supply ad
laboras fixed.
2/ gornai (lSgf) reports on a study of the balance ahauta of all
Hungarian state-owned firms during 1975-82. The study fuund that a high
proportion at? firma with high original profitability were converted- -
through"aeaaalaaa and unpredictable changea of the financial rules, taxaa
andaubaidies" (p. 1i98)--into firma with low final profitability- 24-
investmenthas been recognized (see, for example, Dnrnhusch (1988) and van
Pijnbergen (1985)). rhe adverse effects of policy uncertainty on effort
deserve furrher exploration.
These points are easily illustrated wirh a simple rvo-period example.




where is effort, T1 is a lump sum tax, and s' is a productivity
parameter. Assume in eddirion that the second-period tax burden is linked
to the manager's net income in the first period according to
(17) T2 =T1+hs1
where h is a random variable with expected value P and variance Vsr(k)
Suppose also that the manager's utility index can be described us
(18) U l - + -
Par(s2)
-
wherep is a discounr facror, s "-"overa variable represenrs rhe
expected value operator, and B measures the degree of risk aversion. 1/
/Thisformulation should be viewed as a reduced form epprcximetion.
It is the exact reduced form for the case in which: (1) h follows a
normal (or a truncared normal) distribution; (2) the periodic utility is
=S
-(s/2)(E)5; end (1) l is chosen ro maximize the expected
value of a constant absolute risk-aversion discounted utility U, given by
V =-exp[-B(p1-i7p2)/9J .Noterhar in the second period, 82 is chosen to
maximize It can be shown that maximizing (12) is equivalent to- 25-
- Forthis simple setup, it is easily shown that, whatever the outcome
for period I end the setting of the tax parameter h, the optimal amount of
effort to apply in period 2 is
(19) E2 =—
Itran also he shown--by substituting (19) into (15) and maximizing





Thus, by substituting (20) into the first term on the right hand size of








Figure5 shows some implications. As indicated in the top panel,
when there is no uncertainty a'oout the period-2 taxes, the level of
effort exerted in period 1 depends negatively on the expected level of
period-2 taxes and positively on the period-l productivity tern,..s the
maximizingthe expecteb value of V, and that our results can he extended









effectiveuncertainty about future taxes rises coward infinity, 1/ the
levelof effort exerted in period 1 declines toward the ainimum level
consistent with meeting the requirad period-i tax aseassment.
The degree of tax uncertainty also affacts the response of output to





As indicated in the lower panel of Figure f, as dVac(h) becoaee
indefinitely large, the response of output to a favorable ptndurtivity
chock declinea to zero.
Thisresult extends more generally to the reseonsiveneee of nurput to
othertypes of shocks, including changes in relative prices and other
"aerket signals." The higher the degree of uncertainty about future
taxes, the loder will be the reeponaiveneee of output to any type of
marker signal.
The negative effects of tax unnertatnty on both the supply of effort
andthe responsiveness of output to rather signals argues in favor of
fiscal systems that tax entetprieee and other etonomin agents on a uniint.n
basis, rather than at rates subject to aeent-epetifin nntertainty. It
also suggests that effort and output era enhanced by nredible fiscal
1/ Note that the relevant uncertainty measure is OVac(h)It is the
outcome of weighing the "objective" uncertainty by the eubjecrine degree
ofrisk aversion 5.- 27-




The previous sectiocs of the papet have focused, irtr rife. on tho
iapottanceof public bodget distipline and the case fot tax a ..tems
enccurage ranagers and nonrranageriai vorkets to achieve hig°. Ivelsof
x-efficiency. In compating different tax systems, aoteovec, .i-,rrv
focused iaplicitly on ways to ptovide incentives for x-eff' i- irboot
sactificing the authorities' ability to meet theft cevnoe ro be. fleje
and Szapary (1989) ,McKinnon(1989) and othets have aephasirod the
difficulties encoontered in China and the Soviet Union, for xoaplc, sib n
reform efforts led to a deterioration of tax revenues as a share or COP.
Without a secure tax base that generates adequate public revenue grrwth as
CUP expands, the prospect of maintaining public budget discipl5na loses
credibility.
The prospect of maintaining public budget discipline el.n lose
credibility if the expenditure side of the budget is not a--irely
controlled, One of the mechanisms that can undermine control over public
expenditures is the provision of explicit or implicit insurance to banks
and other enterprises. If not designed appropriately, for exacple, the
provision of public insurance for banks car have adverse implicatirns for
the quality of cbe investment projects that auks finance, ahich ocy- 28-
ulnimatelylead to a ballooning of public expenditurea. 1/ Similarly.
implicit underatandinga that various enterprises will not be allowed to
fail may ultimately undermine public budget discipline and/or monetary
control.
1.Bank insurance
A well-functioning system of financial intemmediation con subatan-
rially strengthen a country's macroeconomic performance. One important
function of financial intermediaries is to economice on the coats of
evaluating investment projects (or borrowers' creditworthiness) cx onte
and monitoring production outcones (or the incomes ond assets of ochtors)
ex post. A second important function of intermediaries is to tcoooform
the combinations of liquidity, yield, and rtok thor ore ovoilohlo to
savers--and, in particular, to make it icoothie for large investment
projects with long gestation periods to ho financed by individuals with
small amounts of savings that they want to keep liquid.
The following example illustrstes the importance of the information-
gathering role of financial intermediaries and emphosires that insurance
j/ This problem is shared by all types of economies; a dronotic recent
example is the case of the savings and loan industry in the United
States.
21InYugoslavia, financial discipline until recently was virtually
nonexistent. Nonbenk enterprises enjoyed close ties with banks, and the
8 National Bank of Yugoslavia (prior to receiving new powers under
legislation enacted in 1969) lacked authority to constrain the ccponoion
6 of bank credit.- 29 -
oarsweaken incentives for intermediaries to evaluate investment projects
effectively. Consider a simple financial system in which all
intermediation is conducted by banks, and in which banks restrict their
financial operations simply to accepting deposits from savers and making
loans to investors. Under the assumption that the banking system is
competitive, each individual bank takes as given the interest oato it must
pay on deposits (°D) and the interest rate it tan charge on locus (ri)
In the absence of insurance, the bank's profits daueud ossenrially on
the performance of irs loan portfolio. The bank selects isa portfolio
from the applications it receives for loans to finance a number of
investment projects that differ in terms of riskiness, got purposes of
simplification, it is assumed that investment projects either fail
completely, in which case the bank receives no loan payments, or ejae
succeed in generating aufficient income to meet the full amount of the
contrersual loan payments. Let denotethe failure probability ft's
projecti and Let l+e denote the yield that project i will generate If it
succeeds. It is convenient to assume that all projects offe rrhe same.
expected income l±r, in particular:
(21) (l+ei)(l-p) + C'p l+cfor all projects i.
The bank's expected profit rate (per unit deposit) can be expressed as
(2i) Rg(l+r)(l-p) -(l+rD)
-xrL-rD-(l+rL)px
where p is the average failure rate on the bank's portfolio of loans
1/ Condition (24) reflects the assumption that there is no reserve
requirement.- 30-
n
(25) =—z. n 1
and x is the cost that the bank incurs in evaluating investment projects.
Theallocation of resources to cx ante evaluation allows the bank to
select a less risky loan portiolio and therefore, to reduce1/
SN
(2g) p =p(x)where -'-<0.
The importance of evaluation by the benk can be sppceoisted by
analyzing the incentives feted by investors, Note thet the investor's




Thus,for a given loan rate r0, the invettet ten expect to beneiit: frcu
undertaking riskier projects. This situation is kno as en adverse
selection problem. 2/ Evsluetion end monioering by the bank plays s key
rolein guiding investment toward less risky projects,
Supposenow that the national authorities change the organization of
the economy by inrroduoing deposit insurance or sosie other scheme tn
guarantee against bank failure. One important objective for introdocing
such insurance in the context of en underdeveloped internal tepitel isetne t
is to promote investment end growth by asking it eester for finsnoiel
j/ We could equally imagine thet p might be held down by the allocation
of resources to monitoring investment and production after the initiel
selection stage.
21Onthe adverse selection literature, see Stiglitr snd Neioe (2951)-31-
intermediariesto raise funds A related obj ective is to rnabilina nba
bankingsystem by reducing the probability of bank runs.
It is assy to demonstrste that insurance against bank failnras oan
laad to undesirable outcomes if it biases inoentivas toast d risky
aotivitias. Fat axaaple an undeaitable way to inttoduoacucb inauranna
would be fat the authotitiea to guatantee individual banks rho
return" of l'4-rL on thair loan portfolios in the bad state in rarurn ion a
fixad fee (per unit of lending). in this case, the axpenrad profit nato
(par deposit) of the individual bank would simply ba
(2g) P.g(iary)(l-p) +(l+rL)p-x-f=l+r1-x-f
where I is the insurance fee. Banks would have innannivna non no spend
any resources on evaluation (i.e. to set x =0)and invaarnra, as notad
earlier, would have incentives to select risky projects. Annunhingly,
even if, from an ax ante perspective, the insurance fee vat nat at a
"fair" level that compensated the authorities for the paynnnna thay nnuid
axpect to make on the basis of historical experience, the aurhoriniaa
might find themselves saddled with large losses ex post- -cnunrnrpanr to
large gains by private sector investors--as banks cur back on ax anta
evaluation and investment shifted toward projects with failura rates that
exceeded the ax ante historical average. /Suchan insuranna achema
The authorities' loss (per unit deposit) would amount to (l+rT),u1-f,
where l is the failure rare realized after the insuranna achaaa haa hann
introduced, A fee that might be considered "fair" baaad on historical
expariance would ha f =(l+rL)po,whera pistie avaraga historical
failure rate. Thus, the realized drain on public financas would aiaply ha- 32-
woialdthus introduce negative externalities via the erosion of the public
budget
The example, of course, has been designed to emphasize that insurance
schemes can have undesirable consequences when introduced in ways that
have adverse effects on incentives. In concept, insurance can be
introduced in ways that leave banks motivated to maintain low-risk loan
portfolios (e.g., insurance fees and payoffs can be based on the riskiness
of bank portfolios) and capitalization requirements con be introduced to
counter the adverse selection incentives of investors by forcing them to
share the losses when investment projects fail. In practice, however
public insurance against bank foilures-whether explicir or ir,plicir--hoo
often resulted in large losses for public budgets to absorb.
2. Soft budzet constraints
Insurance against bank failures is only one of many mechanisms
through which public sectors provide implicit or explicit insurance to
enterprises and thereby distort incentives of enterprise ronogers. The
bank insurance example has emphasized that insurance against failure can
undermine the motivation to evaluate investment decisions appropriately.
It is equally clear that implicit insurance against the failure of any
production unit can undermine incentives to minimize costs .Asfornsi
proportional to the gap between the realized failure rate and the average
failure rate in the pre-insuranca regime: (l+rL)(jl-po). This loss to
the public treasury would be reflected in higher incomes of private sector
borrowers, whose average return on investment projects (after compensating
banks for the insurance fee f) would be s-cT +(lark)(l-o)- 33 -
(19.79)has emphasized in coining the term "soft hudget constraint." firms
have weak incentives to use resources appropriately when choir losses are
disguised or compensated for by subsidies, favorable tax conditions, or
bail-out credits. An environment of soft budget constraints, furthermore,
is a ripe breeding ground for the wage-price spiral, as enterprise
managers grant wage demands with little resistance and either psss nn rho
higherwages directly into higher prices or finance them through a larger
drain on the public budget, which fuels the inflation protess indirentlj.
The undesirable implications of soft budget constraints prnnide en
argument for allowing banks and other firms to fail.The- tFteet nf
failure must be credible, moreover, to morivate enterprise osnegers
appropriately.This argues for promoting a competitive environment in
which the size and political influence of individual enterprises does not
preclude the possibility of allowing them to fail.
VI. c1u4Themarks
This paper has focused on several basic issues that arise in the
design of reform programs for planned economies and growth-ocienrad
adjustment programs more generally.
A crucial ingredient for successful program design is to hasp clearly
focused on the sources of large potential gains in output and price
stability, and to design institutional changes carefully to rssp chess
potential gains. From this perspective, cbs issues discussed in this
paper have emphasized the importance of two types of reforms:
(1) institutional changes aimed at addressing coordinstion fsilnrss snd
soft budget constraints in the presence of negative inflation externeli--34-
ties feeding through public budget deficits; snd (2) reforms simed at
strengthening incentives to provide effort.
In developing simple analytic fcaaeworks to address tha case fcc
institutional reforms, the paper has suggested several extensions of the
literature. The model of negative extecnalities associated with multiple
public decisions makecs builds on Aizesosan (lPSla) in pcoviding insights
into the biases toward 'overspending," "undertaxing," "overborrowing," and
"overinflating." gffectiva acccon to overcome these biases- -which we view
largelyas a matter of overcoming coordination failure-- coy require
different types of institutional changes in different countcces, but is
widely regarded as critical to the success of odjuatmeut oud reform
programs.
Theframework of multiple decision askers has been extended to
analyze how the availability of external resources affects a country's
incentives to carry through en its adjustment efforts, suggesting that on
infusion of external resources increases the short-run gains frost
overcomingcoordination failure but may weaken incentives for adjustmsnt
and reform over the longer run. This result provides an argument for
making externsl finencing conditional on fundamental institutional reforms
thst are capable of overcoming coordination failure on a lasting basis.
Finslly, the model of the adverse effects of uncertainty regarding
future taxes on the present level of effort--and on the responsiveness of
outputto productivity developments and other macket signals--represents,
to our knowledge, e new direction in the formal literature and an
important parallel to existing literature on the adverse effects of policy
uncertainty on investment.- 33- APPENDIX
Derivation of Results
The putpose of this Appendix is tn derive (Be) end (Sb) whirh
prnvide measures nf the effect of external resourree, nn the rnst of
onordinerinn feilure end the temptation to deviete from the roopererive
equilibrium. Note thet from (6") end (7") we ren infer /
Nau. N dD n SN.N dC SU.
(Al) W=[t1 El]
DSN-C dD n 3T3 -c dD? su. c
(A2)su [j{J -- EH
Applyingthe first order conditions (6") end (7") to (Al) end (AD),
reeperrivaly, we infer
N SN.NdC SN. N au r 1 1 [
(A3) =(n-l) itj — - it
c SN. C cv r 1 (A4) —= - Lv—it
Lum
endhence
C N- SN. N SN. C SN.NdG aiv -v r1 1 r1 1 r1,1 1
(AS) LT'i
- - (n-l[itjn
Thefirst two terms on rhe right-hand side of (AS) measure the utility
nhenge attributed to the lower inflerion induced via the rise in F. The
1/ Without loss of generality, we are treating the current period value
of T as predetermined and rhe C1 as endogenous.- 36- APPENDIX
thdrd term measures the adverse welfare effect in the noncooperative
regime generated by the inflaticn externalities associated with excessive
spending of the decision makers.
We investigate the sign of (AS) under the assumption that the utility
of the decision maker has the following separable form:
(A6) U(C,ir) =h(C)
-k(s)
with h' > 0, h" < 0, k' > 0, k" > 0, it'>0, it">0




By differentiating (A7) and evaluating at the noncooperative eaailihrlna






To abbreviate notation further, let
(All) a —- n it' IC
-Eli. N 1iN b =- — it'
L
EU. C 1it b =-—it
C-17- APPENDIX
as also indicated in Figure1.By substituting (Al) and (All) into (Al)
and collectingterms, it can be shown that
(All) _LVN] =fl(-h")1.N
- - IF nfl-h L-h" 0
Note that the slopes of curves BU/BE- and -(BUi/Im)m'in Fiputa 1 are
h" and 0, respectively, at the noncooperative equilibrium point Apolying
the concavity of these schedules, we infer that
,N N C
(All)- n" i 0
Applying(All) to (Al2) ,wecomplete the derivation:
C N
(Ba) oF
Weturn now to drive (Sb). Note from (All) that
(AlA) a -bE=- (nl)[i,]C
Applying (7") and (AG), we obtain
(A15) a -oCn-I [i]C =n-l [h]t
Thus,
C dCP
(AlP) 1(a-b J= h < U- 38-
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